Turkey-Libya Memorandum: Ankara’s influence over Libya’s warlords a double threat to Greece

Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis is preparing for a difficult visit to both Tripoli and Benghazi, likely this coming Sunday. Besides political hurdles, there are coordination issues: in Tripoli, he is expected to meet the foreign minister, the migration minister, and possibly Prime Minister Dbeibah. In Eastern Libya, he will meet General Khalifa Haftar, Speaker Aguila Saleh, and the foreign minister of the parallel government.

Greece’s main goal is to reopen communication channels with both sides and to push for renewed dialogue on delimiting the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This could present an opportunity to form a joint negotiation team, as has been done for other issues like security and oil exploitation.

However, if Saleh and Haftar approve the memorandum before Gerapetritis’s visit, it could poison the atmosphere and undermine the talks.

Gerapetritis may need to return to Libya shortly after, depending on the level of representation in an upcoming EU delegation on migration, which will include Italian and other European officials. If the delegation does not include foreign ministers, Greece may instead be represented by its migration minister.

Message of Dialogue
Despite the inflammatory rhetoric, both Tripoli and Benghazi reference the need for dialogue — something Gerapetritis aims to leverage. Both sides understand that Greece, asserting its sovereign rights, has exploited the absence of a delimitation agreement and imposed a de facto situation using the median line, which aligns with Greek positions and is supported by U.S. energy giants active south of Crete.

It is widely believed that the latest Libyan activity is in response to Greece’s recent moves. These developments have alarmed Athens, especially as the Turkish-Libyan memorandum has returned to the forefront. Tripoli and Benghazi have issued statements and lodged protests with Greek diplomatic authorities following Greece’s announcement of tenders for hydrocarbon licenses in two blocks south of Crete — an area of interest to U.S. giant Chevron.

The situation escalated with the agreement between Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Turkey’s TPAO for seismic surveys in four Libyan offshore blocks. Although the map shown during the signing ceremony aligned with Greece’s median line (as per Law 4001/2011), Athens remains cautious since exact coordinates haven’t been disclosed.

Initial assessments suggest that the easternmost block violates the boundary unilaterally declared and submitted to the UN by Egypt, instead following Libya’s delimitation — a continuation of the Turkish-Libyan pact. It’s too early to assume that Turkish efforts to enforce the memorandum have been neutralized, especially with Turkish research vessels like the Barbaros and Oruc Reis continuing activity near Crete and the median line.

Agreement or The Hague?
Despite the tensions, this might be a unique opportunity for Greece to pressure Libya to restart EEZ negotiations — ideally leading to an agreement, or alternatively, a referral to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. This would compel the Court to assess the legality of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, which is contrary to the Law of the Sea, indirectly challenging Ankara’s attempt to enforce a major geopolitical shift since 2019.

Greece must seize this moment, as past indecision between 2009–2018 allowed the Turkish-Libyan memorandum to emerge, despite the fact that the two sides had come close to an agreement with minimal concessions.

Greece’s strongest ally in this effort may be Libya’s own map, presented during past negotiations, and a letter Libya sent to the UN on December 26, 2019. The letter expressed openness to dialogue, confirmed commitment to Article 33 of the UN Charter, recognized the right of states to approach the International Court of Justice, and stressed Libya’s faith in law and justice as cornerstones of conflict resolution.

Statements from both foreign ministries, as well as comments by Libya’s Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council, Taher Mohamed El-Sonni, all indicated a readiness to engage in delimitation talks with Greece.

Migration Issue
The migration crisis has now been added to the EEZ dispute. With other migration routes restricted, Tobruk — with tacit approval from Eastern Libyan authorities — has become a major exit point for thousands of refugees and migrants, mostly from Sudan and Egypt. Italy’s new restrictive migration policy under Giorgia Meloni is pushing traffickers east, toward Gavdos and Crete.

These increased flows are seen as a bargaining chip used by Haftar to gain indirect recognition from Europe, legitimize his leadership in Eastern Libya, and secure aid from Brussels.

Greece has faced migrant instrumentalization before, notably in Evros, but this situation is more complex. Prime Minister Mitsotakis announced plans to deploy naval vessels to deter smugglers, while Minister Makis Voridis threatened to suspend asylum procedures — all to stem the tide threatening to overwhelm Gavdos and Crete.

However, without coordinated action with Libyan authorities — especially in the East — the flow is unlikely to be curtailed. Opportunities exist for bilateral or EU-level cooperation, such as training the Libyan coast guard with Greek and FRONTEX support.

Haftar’s side has even requested a revival of programs for Libyan students to attend Greece’s military academies — a tradition from the Gaddafi era. Italy, meanwhile, has adopted a “carrot and stick” approach, combining field restrictions on migrants with deepening energy and cultural ties to both Tripoli and Benghazi, including reestablishing an Italian archaeological mission.

Last week, in Benghazi, General Haftar’s son, Belgasem Haftar, who heads Libya’s Reconstruction and Development Fund, organized a major Italian-Libyan business forum that resulted in many agreements across sectors.

Toward Another Civil War?
A major issue complicating relations — for Greece, Europe, and the global community — is the existence of a parallel government in Benghazi, backed by the Parliament and led by Osama Hamad.

Despite Tripoli’s objections, international actors maintain dual relations with both Libyan governments, as Haftar has cemented his control in the East. In contrast, Tripoli’s Prime Minister Dbeibah faces challenges even from within his own camp — heightening the risk of renewed conflict between the rival factions.