Greece's "functional relations" with Turkey are on a tightrope

The Turkish Foreign Minister, speaking in the debate on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, returned to a position that is prohibitive for the existence of progress in the Greek-Turkish conflict, emphasizing that Turkey's goal is the "fair division of the Eastern Mediterranean, where Turkey is taking decisive steps to protect its rights and interests."

Dispelling any illusions about Ankara’s intentions, Mr. Fidan stressed that Turkey supports “the examination of all Aegean disputes as a whole and finding a solution to them through a substantive and constructive dialogue, within the framework of international law and good neighborly relations, so that we can see the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean as an area of ​​stability and prosperity.”

Mr. Fidan also stated that Turkey continues its efforts “to protect the rights of the ‘Turkish’ minority in Western Thrace,” taking, as he said, “reciprocal steps when necessary.”

Diplomatic sources were quick to respond to Mr. Fidan, underlining the great distance separating the two sides, as well as the difficulties that will exist in resuming high-level contacts. "The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf is the one and only difference between Greece and Turkey, therefore revisionist positions and proposals are universally rejected. Greece remains committed to the principles of International Law and wishes, always guided by national interest, to continue the structured dialogue with Turkey on the basis of these principles. Regarding the status of the Muslim minority, the Treaty of Lausanne clearly defines the character of the minority in Thrace as religious, to whose members Greece reserves full equality and citizenship" was the response of diplomatic sources.

Athens had insisted in the previous days on the search for balance, so that the exercise of the country's sovereign rights would be consistent with the "functional relationship", as the Prime Minister calls it, that has been achieved over the last two years with Turkey. In this context, Kyriakos Mitsotakis stated last Friday that the conditions are ripe for the Supreme Cooperation Council to convene in Ankara in the first quarter of 2026, after continuous one-year postponements.

Amid the tense climate caused by Ankara's heightened rhetoric, both on the new island defense doctrine and the Maritime Spatial Planning, as well as the energy agreements with the US and the defense cooperation with Israel, Athens seeks to maintain, if possible, the decompression valves of tensions and the difficult "moratorium" to avoid tensions in bilateral relations.

It is characteristic that, while Athens has consistently justified the successive postponements of the SCC meeting with the argument that it must produce results and “not be done just for the sake of it,” the Prime Minister, speaking on Friday at the “Athens Policy Dialogues” conference (with the editor of “Vima” Yiannis Pretenteris), emphasized that it is not necessary for the SCC to always produce spectacular results and that it could function to review the progress that has been made to date in bilateral relations and in promoting the positive agenda.

This, of course, does not mean that the other side adopts the same approach nor that it will not raise issues at the SCC that will simply confirm the enormous distance that separates the two countries on major and fundamental issues of bilateral relations. And this is the message Hakan Fidan sends with his statements, setting as a condition for the discussion the examination, in the form of a "package", of all of Turkey's claims against our country.

Reference to the veto

Kyriakos Mitsotakis, however, responding to the concerns expressed by various parties that this "functional relationship" with Turkey should not be at the expense of national interests, recalled that "where necessary, Greece corrected its own policy, setting limits and a framework for Turkey".

He even referred to the veto that was cast on Turkey's participation in the European SAFE defense program, as well as to the continuous strengthening of the Armed Forces and the country's deterrent power, referring also to the emblematic event of December 18 at the shipyards of Lorient, France, where the Greek flag will be raised on the frigate Kimon, the first Belh@rra, which will sail to Greece at the beginning of the year and be delivered to the Hellenic Navy.

At a particularly critical juncture in geopolitical developments in the wider region, Turkey finds that the expectation that Trump's second term and his relationship with Erdogan would give a strong boost to its national aspirations is not being confirmed at the moment. On the contrary, the way in which the US president conducts his politics, who does not hesitate to provoke even his closest ally in Israel, does not offer a solid foundation for the strategic relationship that Erdogan hoped to build with the US.

On the contrary, in critical issues such as Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, Washington recognizes the first role in Israel, while in the war in Ukraine, where the Turkish president hoped to take on a strong mediating role, he sees himself as marginalized and even at risk of his country being involved in the conflict after the attacks on tankers of the "shadow" Russian fleet in the Black Sea.

As for the “injections” of optimism from US Ambassador Tom Barak, that a solution can be found to the F-35 issue “in the next 4–6 months”, it is clear that this issue is directly linked to the withdrawal of the S-400, as it was from the beginning…

The “Achilles’ Shield”

Adding to the irritation that has been caused to the Turkish leadership is the increasingly close relationship between Cyprus and the US and the upgraded military cooperation between Nicosia and Israel, which of course does not happen without Washington’s knowledge. It is also no coincidence that these reactions by Ankara are taking place while Greece is being supplied with missile systems from Israel, which will also constitute the core of the “Achilles’ Shield”.

On Thursday, when the Turkish Ministry of National Defense attacked N. Dendias, the Parliament was discussing the approval of the procurement program for the Israeli PULS missile artillery systems, where the Israelis are releasing missiles with a range of 300 km and in the future 500 km.

The Turkish leadership has also been angered by the fact that Athens and Nicosia insisted on their veto on Turkey's participation in the SAFE program, which confirms that powerful European "tools" still remain in the hands of Greece and Cyprus.

Athens, however, believes that, although there is a serious setback in the rapprochement process that culminated with the signing of the Athens Declaration in 2023 and then continued with the Summit Meetings, Turkey will not ultimately choose to escalate the tension on the ground, which would potentially cause an unpredictable and uncontrolled intervention by President Trump in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean.