Alarm in Athens over Ankara’s new moves tempting Egypt and Syria

Turkey is moving to strengthen and consolidate the Turkey–Libya Memorandum, keeping on the table the prospect of signing a similar memorandum with Syria and, above all, courting Egypt to alter the balance of power and alliances created by its close relationship with Greece, which culminated in the signing of the partial EEZ delimitation agreement in 2020.

Fidan’s Mission to Cairo

On August 8, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Cairo, meeting with President el-Sisi and his counterpart Sameh Shoukry, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The visit also confirmed ongoing efforts, including addressing the Gaza crisis, for the full restoration of bilateral relations.

According to Turkish media, H. Fidan’s mission included reviving Turkey’s older proposals for a bilateral maritime delimitation agreement, based on the “Blue Homeland” map submitted by Ankara to the UN, reflecting Turkey’s broader ambitions. This proposal, dating back to the Mubarak era and later resubmitted to the Muslim Brotherhood government under Mohamed Morsi, effectively envisages the division of the Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf between Turkey and Egypt along the median line between their respective mainland coasts, completely ignoring the rights and influence of Greek islands and Cyprus.

Photo: Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan meeting Egyptian President el-Sisi in Cairo

Egypt’s Position

President el-Sisi has previously rejected Turkish proposals, leaving delimitation for the future while taking Greek concerns into account. However, the fact that despite repeated attempts by Athens – even before 2015 – to fully delimit the EEZ with Egypt east of the 25th meridian, Cairo did not respond, indicates that the Egyptian leadership, under internal pressures and Foreign Ministry bureaucracy, prefers to keep the issue open for diplomatic leverage against both Athens and Ankara.

If Egypt succumbs to the temptation to begin negotiations with Turkey over maritime delimitation, a serious crisis could erupt in the Eastern Mediterranean, potentially sabotaging the Greek–Egyptian strategic relationship, which has been mutually beneficial. However, by agreeing to the partial delimitation deal with Greece and rejecting the Turkey–Libya Memorandum through letters to the UN, Egypt has largely committed not to accept Turkey’s proposal willingly.

Turkey, in addition to offering Egypt maritime zones that do not belong to it, is promoting the “vision” of integrating Egypt into the regional energy map as a hub for energy transit. By blocking major projects such as EastMed and the Data Corridor on the ground, Turkey signals to Cairo that such projects can only proceed with its consent and under the conditions it sets, which also affect Egypt’s future in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cooperation with Turkey is thus presented as the only way for Egypt to become an energy and transit hub to Europe.

A few days after Fidan’s visit to Cairo, Turkish media revealed that Ankara secured Egypt’s support for the KAAN fifth-generation fighter program, still in its early stages. Even if such military collaboration does not materialize, it shows steps toward restoring military cooperation between the two countries, given Cairo’s interest in Turkish-made drones.

A diplomatic source in Athens, however, emphasized Egypt’s strong commitments at both leadership and Foreign Ministry levels, reflecting the strategic nature of Greek–Egyptian relations. The same source noted that Egyptians would even consider a bilateral extension of the 2020 delimitation agreement, while aiming for a comprehensive maritime delimitation in the region in the future.

Open Channels with Syria

Last week, Turkey signed a significant military cooperation agreement with the transitional government of Syria, which, while objectionable to Israel, ensures Ankara’s indirect military presence in the country and influence over the government of Ahmed al-Sarraa. For Turkey, the proposal for maritime delimitation in the spirit of the Turkey–Libya Memorandum, which would claim part of Cyprus’ EEZ, has never been off the table.

Athens, by inviting Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shibani to the capital, seeks to maintain open channels with Damascus and highlight the benefits of a functional relationship with Greece, in contrast to the consequences of Syria siding with Turkish initiatives that violate the Law of the Sea and EU member state rights. According to the Greek Foreign Ministry, a trilateral Greece–Syria–Cyprus meeting is planned for September on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

Turkish media reported that the Syrian Foreign Minister was cautious, stating that Syria “will not participate in any bloc formed against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean” and that it “acts with understanding and respect for Ankara’s legitimate interests in the region.” A Greek diplomatic source, however, emphasized that the Syrian FM accepted the trilateral, which carries strong symbolic weight as it is held under the UN framework and is essential for Damascus’ international rebranding post-Assad regime.

The Turkey–Libya Play

Turkey’s broader strategy continues with Libya at the center. Ankara’s outreach to Benghazi is ongoing, with concerning indications of a potential pre-signing and on-the-ground implementation of the Turkey–Libya Memorandum in eastern Libya.

A notable example of Ankara’s activity was the visit of Turkey’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin, Erdogan’s “right-hand man” in Benghazi, who met with General Haftar.